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Abstract 
 
A STUDY ON FALSE INFORMATION INJECTION ATTACK ON DYNAMIC STATE 
ESTIMATION IN MULTI-SENSOR SYSTEMS 
By Jingyang Lu, Master 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science 
at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2015. 
Major Director: Ruixin Niu 
In this thesis, the impact of false information injection is investigated for linear dynamic systems 
with multiple sensors. It is assumed that the Kalman filter system is unaware of the existence of 
false information and the adversary is trying to maximize the negative effect of the false 
information on the Kalman filter's estimation performance. First, a brief introduction to the 
Kalman filter is shown in the thesis. We mathematically characterize the false information attack 
under different conditions. For the adversary, many closed-form results for the optimal attack 
strategies that maximize the Kalman filter's estimation error are theoretically derived. It is shown 
that by choosing the optimal correlation coefficients among the bias noises and allocating power 
optimally among sensors, the adversary could significantly increase the Kalman filter's 
estimation errors. To be concrete, a target tracking system is used as an example in the thesis. 
From the adversary's point of view, the best attack strategies are obtained under different 
scenarios, including a single-sensor system with both position and velocity measurements, and a 
multi-sensor system with position and velocity measurements. Under a constraint on the total 
power of the injected bias noises, the optimal solutions are solved from two perspectives: trace 
and determinant of the mean squared error matrix. Numerical results are also provided in order to 
illustrate the negative effect which the proposed attack strategies could inflict on the Kalman 
filter. 
II. INTRODUCTION
System state estimation in the presence of an adversary that injects false information into
sensor readings is an important problem with wide application areas, such as target tracking
with compromised sensors, secure monitoring of dynamic electric power systems, and radar
detection and tracking in the presence of jammers. This topic has attracted considerable attention
and interest recently [1]–[9]. In [1], the problem of how to take advantage of the power system
configuration to introduce arbitrary bias to the system was investigated. In [2], the authors showed
the impact of malicious attacks on real-time electricity market and how the attackers can make
profit by manipulating certain values of the measurements. They also provided certain strategies
to find the optimal single attack vector. The relationship between the attackers and the control
center was discussed in [3], where both the adversary’s attack strategies and the control center’s
attack detection algorithms have been proposed. False data attacks on the electricity market
have also been investigated in [4] and [5]. In [6], the data frame attack was formulated as a
quadratically constrained quadratic program (QCQP). The data frame attack aiming to mislead
the power system control center was studied in [7], where it was shown that the system could
be made unobservable by controlling only half of a critical set of measurements. Subspace
method was presented in [8] showing how to learn the system operating subspace from the
measurement and launch the attack accordingly either by hiding the false information in the
subspace or misleading the system to remove the data not being attacked. In [9], the relation
between a target and a MIMO radar was characterized as a two-person zero-sum game. However,
in the aforementioned publications, only the problem of static system state estimation has been
considered.
In this thesis, for a linear dynamic system, we analyze the impact of the injected false
information on the Kalman filter’s state estimation performance over time, which has not got
much attention in the literature. Some related publications exist on sensor management [10]–[13],
where the authors showed how to manage the sensors to minimize the mean squared estimation
error or its lower bound so that a more accurate state estimate can be obtained. This problem
is clearly opposite to the problem we study in the thesis, where the goal for the adversary is
to maximize the mean squared state estimation error, and to confuse the Kalman filter. In [14],
the problem of sensor bias estimation and compensation for target tracking has been addressed.
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Interested readers are referred to [14] and the references therein for details. In [15], impact of
the injected biases on a Kalman filter’s estimation performance has been studied showing that if
the false information is injected at a single time, its impact converges to zero as time goes on; if
the false information is injected into the system continuously, the estimation error tends to reach
a steady state. In this thesis, we derive the best strategies for the adversary to attack the Kalman
filter system from the perspective of the trace of the mean squared error (MSE) matrix, and obtain
some closed-form results. We also derive the optimal attack strategy for the adversary, which
maximizes the impact of the false information from the determinant perspective. By adopting the
objective function as the determinant of the MSE matrix, we change the problem significantly.
As shown later in the thesis, the optimal attack strategy that maximizes the determinant of the
MSE matrix is a function of the Kalman filter’s state estimation covariance and hence “adaptive”
to the Kalman filter; whereas that maximizing the trace of the MSE matrix is not a function of
the Kalman filter’s state estimation covariance.
The rest of thesis is organized as follows. Chapter III gives a brief introduction to the Kalman
filter system. The false information attack problem in a general discrete-time linear dynamic
system is formulated in the Section IV. Chapter V mathematically characterizes the impact of
deterministic or random false information on the Kalman filter’s system. Chapter VI and VII
analyze how to get the best strategy to attack the Kalman filter’s system by maximizing the trace
and determinant of the MSE matrix from the perspective of the adversary. Under the constraint
on the adversary’s total sensor bias noise power, different strategies are derived to maximize the
Kalman filter’s mean squared state estimation error for different scenarios. Chapter VIII provides
the simulation results and Chapter IX concludes the thesis.
2
III. KALMAN FILTER SYSTEM
A. Linear Dynamic State Estimation
The discrete-time linear dynamic system [16] can be described as below,
xk+1 = Fkxk +Gkuk + vk (1)
where Fk is the system state transition matrix, xk is the system state vector at time k, uk is a
known input vector, Gk is the input gain matrix, and vk is a zero-mean white Gaussian process
noise with covariance matrix E[vkvTk ] = Qk. The measurement equation is
zk = Hkxk +wk (2)
where wk is the sequence of zero-mean white Gaussian measurement noise, and
E[wkw
T
k ] = Rk (3)
The matrices Fk, Gk, Hk, Qk, and Rk are assumed to be known with proper dimensions and
possibly time varying. The initial state x0 in general is unknown and modeled as Gaussian
distributed with known mean and covariance. The two noise sequences and the initial state are
mutually independent. Sometimes, vk is taken as Γkvk with vk being an nv-dimensional vector
and Γk a known nx × nv matrix. Then the covariance matrix of the noise in the state equation
can be written as
E
[
(Γkvk) (Γkvk)
T
]
= ΓkQkΓ
T
k (4)
The linearity of (1) and (2) ensures the preservation of the Gaussian property of the state and
measurements. The estimate of the system state xi based on the observations up to time k can
be written as,
xˆi|k = E
[
xi|Z
k
] (5)
where
Zk = {zi : i ≤ k} (6)
If i = k, the conditional mean is called the estimate of the system; if i < k, the conditional
mean is called the smoothed value of the state; if i > k, the conditional mean is called predicted
value of the state. The estimation error is defined as
x˜i|k = xi − xˆi|k (7)
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The conditional covariance matrix of xi given the data Zk or the covariance associated with the
estimate is
Pi|k = E
[(
xi − xˆi|k
) (
xi − xˆi|k
)T
|Zk
]
(8)
B. The Recursive Estimation Algorithm
In terms of observation z according to the minimum mean squared error (MMSE) criterion,
the estimate of x with prior information x ∼ N(x¯,Pxx) is
xˆ = E [x|z] = x¯+PxzP
−1
zz (z− z¯) (9)
and the corresponding mean squared error (MSE) is
Pxx|z = E
[
(x− xˆ)(x− xˆ)T
]
= Pxx −PxzP
−1
zz Pzx (10)
Given the initial estimate xˆ0|0 of x0 and the associated initial covariance P0|0, the cycle of the
dynamic estimation will consider mapping the estimate
xˆk|k = E
[
xk|Z
k
] (11)
which is the conditional mean of the state at the time k, and the covariance matrix
Pk|k = E
[
[xk − xˆk|k][xk − xˆk|k]
T |Zk
] (12)
into the corresponding variables at the next stage, that is to say, xˆk+1|k+1 and Pk+1|k+1. Since
the process noise is white and Gaussian, the predicted state xˆk+1|k is
xˆk+1|k = E
[
xk+1|Z
k
]
= E
[
Fkxk +Gkuk + vk|Z
k
] (13)
= Fkxˆk|k +Gkuk
The state prediction error, namely the difference between the system state and state prediction
is
x˜k+1|k = xk+1 − xˆk+1|k = Fkx˜k|k + vk (14)
Using the equation above, we can get the state prediction covariance as
Pk+1|k = E
[
x˜k+1|kx˜
T
k+1|k|Z
k
] (15)
= FkE
[
x˜k|kx˜
T
k|k|Z
k
]
FTk + E
[
vkv
T
k
]
= FkPk|kF
T
k +Qk
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The predicted measurement is the expectation of the measurement conditioned on Zk,
zk+1|k = E
[
zk+1|Z
k
] (16)
= E
[
Hk+1xk+1 +wk+1|Z
k
]
= Hk+1xˆk+1|k
The measurement prediction error is
z˜k+1|k = zk+1 − zˆk+1|k = Hk+1x˜k+1|k +wk+1 (17)
Thus the measurement prediction covariance, which is defined as Sk+1, is
Sk+1 = Hk+1Pk+1|kH
T
k+1 +Rk+1 (18)
The covariance between the state and measurement is
E
[
x˜k+1|kz˜
T
k+1|k|Z
k
]
= E
[
x˜k+1|k
[
Hk+1x˜k+1|k +wk+1
]T
|Zk
]
(19)
= Pk+1|kH
T
k+1
The filter gain can be calculated as
Wk+1 = Pk+1|kH
T
k+1S
−1
k+1 (20)
Thus the updated state estimate can be written as
xˆk+1|k+1 = xˆk+1|k +Wk+1τk+1 (21)
where
τk+1 = zk+1 − zˆk+1|k = z˜k+1|k (22)
which is called innovation or measurement residual. Finally, the updated covariance of the state
at time k + 1 is,
Pk+1|k+1 = Pk+1|k −Pk+1|kH
T
k+1S
−1
k+1Hk+1Pk+1|k (23)
= Pk+1|k −Wk+1Sk+1W
T
k+1
An alternative form for the covariance update can be provided as
P−1k+1|k+1 = P
−1
k+1|k +H
T
k+1R
−1
k+1Hk+1 (24)
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C. Statistical Test for Filter Consistency
Under the linear-Gaussian assumption, the conditional probability density function of the state
xk at the time k is
p(xk|Z
k) = N (xˆk,Pk|k) (25)
Based on (25), we can get the first two moments,
E
[
xk − xˆk|k
]
= E
[
x˜k|k
]
= 0 (26)
E
[[
xk − xˆk|k
] [
xk − xˆk|k
]T]
= E
[
x˜k|kx˜
T
k|k
]
= Pk|k
Define the normalized estimation error squared as
ǫk = x˜
T
k|kP
−1
k|kx˜k|k (27)
Under hypothesis H0 that the filter is consistent and linear Gaussian assumption, ǫk is Chi-square
distributed with nx degrees of freedom, where nx is the dimension of the system state x, and
E [ǫk] = nx (28)
Based on the Monte Carlo simulations with N independent samples ǫik, i = 1, ..., N , the sample
average of ǫk can be obtained,
ǫ¯k =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ǫik (29)
It can be shown that Nǫ¯k follows a Chi-square distribution with Nnx degrees of freedom. The
hypothesis of H0 is accepted if
ǫ¯k ∈ [r1, r2] (30)
where the acceptance interval is determined such that
P{ǫ¯k ∈ [r1, r2]|H0} = 1− α (31)
and α is the power of the test.
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IV. SYSTEM MODEL
Let us assume that M sensors are used by the linear system. The measurement at time k
collected by sensor i is
zk,i = Hk,ixk,i +wk,i (32)
with Hk,i being the measurement matrix, and wk,i a zero-mean white Gaussian measurement
noise with covariance matrix E[wk,iwTk,i] = Rk,i, for i = 1, · · · ,M . We further assume that
the measurement noises are independent across sensors. The matrices Fk, Gk, Hk,i, Qk,i, and
Rk,i are assumed to be known with proper dimensions. For such a linear and Gaussian dynamic
system, the Kalman filter is the optimal state estimator. In this thesis, we assume that a bias
bk,i is injected by the adversary into the measurement of the ith sensor at time k intentionally.
Therefore, the measurement equation (32) becomes
z′k,i = Hk,ixk +wk,i + bk,i = zk,i + bk,i (33)
where z′k,i is the corrupted measurement, bk,i is either an unknown constant or a random variable
independent of {vk,i} and {wk,i}.
For compactness, let us denote the system sensor observation as zk = [zTk1, · · · , zTkM ]T , which
contains the observations from all the M sensors. Similarly, let us denote the system bias vector
as bk = [b
T
k1, · · · ,b
T
kM ]
T which includes the biases at all the M sensors. Correspondingly, the
measurement matrix becomes
Hk = [H
T
k1, · · · ,H
T
kM ]
T (34)
With these notations, it is easy to convert (32) and (33) into the following equations respectively.
zk = Hkxk +wk (35)
and
z′k = zk + bk (36)
Further, we have the measurement error covariance matrix corresponding to wk is
Rk =


Rk,1 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 · · · Rk,M

 (37)
which is obtained by using the assumption that measurement noises are independent across
sensors.
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V. IMPACT OF FALSE INFORMATION INJECTION
In this thesis, let us assume that the adversary attacks the system by injecting false information
into the sensors while the Kalman filter is unaware of such attacks. We start with the case where
biases (bk) are continuously injected into the system starting from a certain time K. Note that
single injection is just a special case of continuous injection when bk are set to be nonzero at
time K and zero otherwise.
In the continuous injection case, the Kalman filter’ extra state estimation error, which is caused
by the continuous bias injection alone, is derived in [17] and provided as follows.
Proposition 1. The Kalman filter’s state estimation error at time K +N is
xˆ′K+N |K+N − xK+N = xˆK+N |K+N − xK+N
+
N∑
m=0
(
m−1∏
i=0
BK+N−i
)
WK+N−mbK+N−m (38)
where xˆ′K+N |K+N is the Kalman filter’s state estimate in the presence of the bias sequence {bk},
xˆK+N |K+N is the Kalman filter’s state estimate in the absence of the bias,
BK , (I−WKHK)FK−1, (39)
I is the identity matrix, and WK is the Kalman filter gain [16] at time K. As a result, the extra
state estimation error at time K + N due to the continuous bias bk injected at and after time
K is
N∑
m=0
(
m−1∏
i=0
BK+N−i
)
WK+N−mbK+N−m, (40)
If {bk} is a zero-mean, random, and independent sequence, the extra mean squared error
(EMSE) at a particular time instant K + N due to the bias alone is provided in the following
proposition. Using the results from Proposition 1, the proof of Proposition 2 is provided as well.
Proposition 2. When the bias sequence {bk} is zero mean, random, and independent over time,
the EMSE at time K +N due to the biases injected at and after time K, denoted as AK+N ,
is
AK+N =
N∑
m=0
DmΣK+N−mD
T
m (41)
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where
Dm =
(
m−1∏
i=0
BK+N−i
)
WK+N−m (42)
∏−1
i=0BK+N−i = I is an identity matrix, and ΣK+N−m is the covariance matrix of bK+N−m.
Proof Sketches: Let us denote x˜K+N |K+N = xˆK+N |K+N − xK+N as the Kalman filter’s state
estimation error in the absence of any false information, and
am =
(
m−1∏
i=0
BK+N−i
)
WK+N−mbk+N−m (43)
From (38), we can get
AK+N
= E

(x˜K+N |K+N + N∑
m=0
am
)(
x˜K+N |K+N +
N∑
n=0
an
)T
− E
(
x˜K+N |K+N x˜
T
K+N |K+N
)
= E
(
x˜K+N |K+N
N∑
n=0
aTn
)
+ E
(
N∑
m=0
amx˜
T
K+N |K+N
)
+ E
(
N∑
m=0
N∑
n=0
ama
T
n
)
= E
(
N∑
m=0
N∑
n=0
ama
T
n
)
where the last line is due to the fact that am and an have zero mean, are independent from each
other when m 6= n, and are independent from x˜K+N |K+N . Using this fact again, we further have
E
(
N∑
m=0
N∑
n=0
ama
T
n
)
= E
(
N∑
m=0
ama
T
m
)
(44)
=
N∑
m=0
DmΣK+N−mD
T
m
where Dm has been defined in Proposition 2.
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VI. THE OPTIMAL ATTACK STRATEGY
A. Problem Formulation for a General Linear System
In this thesis, we investigate the optimal attack strategy that an adversary can adopt to maxi-
mize the system estimator’s estimation error. This problem can be formulated as a constrained
optimization problem. Without loss of generality, let us consider that the attacker is interested in
maximizing the system state estimation error at time K right after a single false bias is injected
at time K. In this case, we are interested in designing the injected random bias’ covariance
matrix such that
max
ΣK
Tr
[
PK|K +AK(ΣK)
]
s.t. Tr(ΣK) = a
2 (45)
where a is a constant, Tr(·) is the matrix trace operator, and PK|K is the Kalman filter’s state
estimation error covariance matrix at time K in the absence of any false information. Note that
it is meaningful to have a constraint on the trace of ΣK , since it can be deemed as the power of
injected sensor bias bK , and a smaller power for bK reduces the probability that the adversary is
detected by the system estimator using an innovation based detector. Note that the optimization
problem is equivalent to the one that maximizes Tr (AK(ΣK)), since PK|K is not a function
of ΣK , and trace is a linear operator. If one is more interested in the determinant of the mean
squared estimation error matrix, a similar optimization problem can be easily formulated as
follows.
max
ΣK
∣∣PK|K +AK(ΣK)∣∣
s.t. Tr(ΣK) = a
2 (46)
B. Equivalent Measurement in Multi-Sensor Systems
To simplify the mathematical analysis, it is helpful to derive the equivalent sensor measure-
ment, which is a linear combination of the observations from all the sensors, and is a sufficient
statistic containing all the information about the systems state. The equivalent sensor measure-
ment vector and its corresponding covariance matrix should have much smaller dimensionality
than the original measurement vector and its covariance, making the mathematical manipulation
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and derivation later in the thesis much simpler. In a information filter recursion [16], which is
equivalent to the Kalman filter recursion, we have
yˆk|k = yˆk|k−1 +H
T
kR
−1
k zk (47)
where yˆk|k = P−1k|kxk|k and yˆk|k−1 = P
−1
k|k−1xk|k−1. It is clear that yˆk|k−1 represents the prior
knowledge about the system state based on past sensor data, and the second term in (47)
represents the new information from the new sensor data zk, which can be expanded by using
(34) and (37) as follows.
HTkR
−1
k zk
= [HTk1, · · · ,H
T
kM ]


R−1k1 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 · · · R−1kM




zk1
.
.
.
zkM


=
M∑
i=1
HTkiR
−1
ki zki
(48)
In the following derivations, we skip the time index k for simplicity. Our purpose is to find an
equivalent measurement ze such that
ze = Hex+we (49)
where we ∼ N (0,Re), and
HTeR
−1
e ze =
M∑
i=1
HTi R
−1
i zi (50)
Let us consider two cases. First, suppose all the His are the same (Hi = H) , then it is natural
to set He = H. Note that a sufficient condition for (50) to be true is
ze = Re
M∑
i=1
R−1i zi (51)
Taking the covariance on the both sides of (51), we get
Re = Recov
(
M∑
i=1
R−1i zi
)
RTe
= Re
[
M∑
i=1
R−1i Ri(R
−1
i )
T
]
RTe
(52)
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This implies that
Re =
(
M∑
i=1
R−1i
)−1
(53)
In the second case, let us assume that the system state x is observable based on the observations
from all the sensors, meaning that the Fisher information matrix
∑M
i=1H
T
i R
−1
i Hi is invertible.
In this case, by setting He = I, using (50), and following a similar procedure as in the first case,
we have
ze = Re
M∑
i=1
HTi R
−1
i zi (54)
and
Re =
(
M∑
i=1
HTi R
−1
i Hi
)−1
(55)
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VII. A TARGET TRACKING EXAMPLE
In this thesis, we give a concrete target tracking example. We assume that the target moves
in a 1-dimensional space according to a discrete white noise acceleration model [16], which
can still be described by the plant and measurement equations given in (1) and (32). In such a
system, the state is defined as xk = [ξk ξ˙k]T , where ξk and ξ˙k denote the target’s position and
velocity at time k respectively. The input uk is a zero sequence. The state transition matrix is
F =

 1 T
0 1

 (56)
where T is the time between measurements. The process noise is vk = Γvk, where vk is a
zero mean white acceleration noise, with variance σ2v , and the vector gain multiplying the scalar
process noise is given by ΓT = [T 2/2 T ]. The covariance matrix of the process noise is therefore
Q = σ2vΓΓ
T
.
In this thesis, we investigate the attack strategies for two scenarios. In the first scenario, only
position measurements are available to the sensors, whereas in the second scenario, the sensors
measure both position and velocity of the target.
A. Attack Strategy Analysis from Trace Perspective
1) Attack Strategy for Multiple Position Sensors: In this case, it is assumed that at each sensor,
only the position measurement is available, so that Hi = [1 0]. At each sensor, the measurement
noise process is zero-mean, white, and with variance, σ2wi . In order to simplify the problem, we
think of zek as the equivalent measurement, which is a linear combination of the measurements
from all the sensors. Using the results we derived in Section VI-B for the first case, namely (51)
and (53), the measurement equation (33) becomes
z′k = zek + bek (57)
where
zek =
M∑
m=0
cizki (58)
bek =
M∑
m=0
cibki (59)
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and
ci =
1/σ2wi∑M
j=1
(
1/σ2wj
) (60)
which is the corresponding coefficient/weight for the ith sensor. In this target tracking problem,
let us first consider the strategy that maximizes the trace of the Kalamn filter mean squared
estimation error matrix, which is the solution of (45) in Section VI-A. In this case,
ΣK =


σ2b1 ρ12σb1σb2 · · · ρ1Mσb1σbM
ρ12σb1σb2 σ
2
b2
· · · ρ2Mσb2σbM
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
ρ1Mσb1σbM ρ2Mσb2σbM · · · σ
2
bM

 (61)
where σ2bi is the variance of the random bias injected at the ith sensor (bi), and ρij is the
correlation coefficient between bi and bj . Therefore, (45) is equivalent to
maxTr [AK ]
s.t.
M∑
i=1
σ2bi = a
2
−1 ≤ ρij ≤ 1, for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ M (62)
To simplify this problem, we first use the equivalent measurement approach to convert the multi-
sensor problem to a single sensor problem. Namely, in Proposition 2 by replacing
Hk =


1 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 0


with He = [1 0], and replacing ΣK with
ΣeK = E[b
2
eK
] (63)
= E

( M∑
i=1
cibi
)2
=
M∑
i=1
c2iσ
2
bi
+
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
2ρijcicjσbiσbj
we can easily show that AK = D0ΣeKDT0 . Since ΣeK is a scalar and D0 is not a function of
ΣK , maximizing the trace of AK is equivalent to maximizing ΣeK .
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First, let us consider the case where the random biases at different sensors are independent
meaning that ρi,j = 0 for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ M . The optimal strategy for the adversary in this case is
clearly to put all the bias power to the sensor with the largest coefficient ci:
Proposition 3. For a system with M sensors, if the adversary injects independent random noises,
the best strategy is to allocate all the power to the sensor with the smallest noise variance.
Next, let us consider the more general case where the random biases are dependent. By
inspecting (63), it is clear that to maximize ΣeK , we need to set all the ρijs to 1. As a result,
(63) becomes
ΣeK =
(
M∑
i=1
ciσbi
)2
(64)
Now, the optimization problem in (62) has been converted to the following problem:
max
(
M∑
i=1
ciσbi
)2
s.t.
M∑
i=1
σ2bi = a
2 (65)
The above problem can be solved by using standard constrained optimization techniques [18]
based on gradient and Hessian, which are rather involved. Here we solve the problem using a
much simpler geometric solution, which has been shown to give the same solution as that by
the standard optimization techniques. We start with the simplest case with two sensors, in which
we need to solve the following optimization problem.
max c1σb1 + c2σb2 (66)
s.t. σ2b1 + σ
2
b2 = a
2
We can get the optimal solution by analyzing the problem geometrically with the norm vector
(c1, c2)
T of the objective function as shown in Fig. 1. The constraint of the problem is represented
by the circle with a radius of a. We move the line l1 with the slope −
c1
c2
to get the largest intercept
between l1 and σ2 axis under the constraint that there is an intersection between the circle and
the line l1. The corresponding optimal solution is found when l1 becomes a tangent line to the
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Fig. 1. Geometric solution for systems with two sensors.
circle, which is
σ1 =
c1a√
c21 + c
2
2
σ2 =
c2a√
c21 + c
2
2
(67)
For a system with arbitrary number of sensors, we can repeat the same procedure to find the
optimal solution by using hyper planes and hyperspheres. In general, the optimal attack strategy
can be found and summarized as follows.
Theorem 1. For a system with M sensors, the optimal strategy for the adversary is to inject
statistically correlated random noises with a pairwise correlation coefficient of 1. The random
bias power is allocated such that
σbi =
cia√∑M
j=1 c
2
j
, for i = 1, · · · ,M. (68)
2) Attack Strategy for a Single Position and Velocity Sensor: In this case, let us assume
that the sensors collect both position and velocity measurements of the target. Therefore, the
measurement matrix for the ith sensor is Hi = I2, where I2 is a 2 × 2 identity matrix. At the
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ith sensor, the adversary injects the bias noise vector bki to the sensor measurement zki , where
bki = [bpi bvi ]
T consists of biases in position and velocity measurements. Let us assume that the
system bias vector bk = [bTk1, · · · ,bTkM ]T is zero-mean and has a 2M × 2M covariance matrix
ΣK . Further, the (i, j)th 2× 2 submatrix for ΣK is defined as
ΣK(i, j) =

 ρbpi,bpjσbpiσbpj ρbpi,bvjσbpiσbvj
ρbvi,bpjσbviσbpj ρbvi,bvjσbviσbvj

 (69)
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ M . σbpi and σbvi are the position and velocity bias noise standard deviations
at the ith sensor respectively. The ρs are defined as the proper correlation coefficients between
components of the bias vector, and ρbpi,bpi = ρbvi,bvi = 1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ M . Since the position
bias bp and velocity bias bv have different units, we need an appropriate constraint for bias noise
power. Here we assume that the total noise power is defined as
M∑
i=1
σ2bpi + T
2σ2bvi (70)
Note that this is a meaningful power definition, since the two terms in the above equation has
the same unit. Recall that according to the target tracking system plant equation and ignoring
the system process noise, we have ξk+1 = ξk+T ξ˙k. Therefore, the power defined in (70) can be
interpreted as the summation of the extra mean squared errors for the position estimate caused
by independent bias injections. We can see that the best attack strategy derived under a constraint
on power defined in (70) can be easily adjusted and extended for other power definitions, as
long as in the new definition, the second term is proportional to T 2σ2bvi .
As we can use the equivalent sensor to represent the multiple sensors, we focus on the single-
sensor case first. If we are interested in the case of N = 0, maximizing the trace of AK
is equivalent to maximize the WKΣKWTK . We assume that the adversary knows the system
models and the prior information P0|0 at time zero, so that he/she can calculate the offline
Kalman filter gain matrix Wk recursively. Therefore, the best strategy the adversary can adopt
to attack the system is the solution to the following optimization problem:
max
ΣK
Tr
[
WKΣKW
T
K
]
s.t. σ2bp + T
2σ2bv = a
2
−1 ≤ ρbp,bv ≤ 1
σbp , σbv > 0 (71)
17
where
ΣK =

 σ2bp ρbp,bvσbpσbv
ρbp,bvσbpσbv σ
2
bv

 (72)
and
WK =

 w11 w12
w21 w22

 (73)
It is easy to show that
Tr
[
WKΣKW
T
K
]
= Tr
[
WTKWKΣK
]
= (w211 + w
2
21)σ
2
bp + (w
2
12 + w
2
22)σ
2
bv
+ 2(w11w12 + w21w22)ρbp,bvσbpσbv
(74)
According to the sign of (w11w12 + w21w22), we can set the value of the ρbp,bv to maximize
the objective function. For example, if (w11w12 + w21w22) is positive, we set ρbp,bv = 1 and the
optimization problem becomes
max(w11σbp + w12σbv)
2 + (w21σbp + w22σbv)
2
s.t. σ2bp + T
2σ2bv = a
2 (75)
σbp , σbv ≥ 0
We have solved the optimization problem in (75), and summarize the results in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2. For a system with one sensor observing position and velocity of the target, the
optimal strategy for the adversary is to inject random noise that has dependent position and
velocity components. If w11w12 + w21w22 > 0, the correlation coefficient ρbp,bv should be set as
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1, and the random bias power is allocated such that
σbp = a sin(θ
∗) (76)
σbv =
a
T
cos(θ∗)
θ∗ =
π
4
−
φ
2
φ = arctan
[
β2 − β1T 2
2T (α1 + α2)
]
w211 + w
2
21 = β1
w212 + w
2
22 = β2
w11w12 = α1
w21w22 = α2
When w11w12+w21w22 < 0, we should set ρbp,bv = −1 and set α1 = −w11w12 and α2 = −w21w22.
The rest of the equations in formula (76) remain the same.
Proof Sketches: Let us first denote
w211 + w
2
21 = β1
w212 + w
2
22 = β2
w11w12 = α1
w21w22 = α2
(77)
The constraint in (71) can be written as
σ2bp
T 2
+ σ2bv =
a2
T 2
= a21 (78)
Now we set σbp = a1T sin(θ) and σbv = a1 cos(θ). Plugging σbp and σbv into the objective
function, we have the following equivalent optimization problem
max
θ
a21
[
β1T
2
1 + β2
2
+ A sin(2θ + φ)
]
s.t. 0 ≤ θ ≤
π
2
(79)
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where
A =
√
1
4
(β2 − β1T 2)
2 + T 2(α1 + α2)2 (80)
tan(φ) =
β2 − β1T 2
2T (α1 + α2)
(81)
Clearly, the optimal solution is
θ∗ =
π
4
−
φ
2
(82)
3) Attack Strategy for Multiple Position and Velocity Sensors: In this case, let us consider the
case of M = 2, where the measurement matrix is H = [I2 I2]T . The measurement covariance
matrix for the ith sensor is assumed to be
Ri =

 σ2pi 0
0 σ2vi

 (83)
Now, according to (55), we have
Re = [R
−1
1 +R
−1
2 ]
−1
=

 (σ−2p1 + σ−2p2 )−1 0
0
(
σ−2v1 + σ
−2
v2
)−1

 (84)
According to (54), we define
Ci = ReH
T
i R
−1
i
=

 σ
−2
pi
σ−2p1 +σ
−2
p2
0
0
σ−2vi
σ−2v1 +σ
−2
v2

 (85)
as the weighting matrix for the ith sensor’s observation zi. Further, we define
cpi = Ci(1, 1)
cvi = Ci(2, 2)
(86)
both of which are positive numbers. The equivalent noise injection is therefore
beK =
2∑
i=1
CibKi (87)
So the covariance matrix of the equivalent bias vector is
ΣeK =
2∑
i=1
2∑
i=j
CiΣK(i, j)C
T
j (88)
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where ΣK(i, j) has been defined in (69). It can be shown that
ΣeK =

 s1 s2
s2 s3

 (89)
where
s1 = c
2
p1
σ2bp1 + c
2
p2
σ2bp2 + 2ρbp1 ,bp2cp1cp2σbp1σbp2
s3 = c
2
v1
σ2bv1 + c
2
v2
σ2bv2 + 2ρbv1 ,bv2cv1cv2σbv1σbv2
(90)
s2 = cp1cv1ρbp1 ,bv1σbp1σbv1 + cp1cv2ρbp1 ,bv2σbp1σbv2
+ cp2cv1ρbp2 ,bv1σbp2σbv1 + cp2cv2ρbp2 ,bv2σbp2σbv2
(91)
The optimization problem can be written as follows.
max
ΣeK
Tr
[
WeKΣeKW
T
eK
] (92)
s.t. σ2bp1 + σ
2
bp2
+ T 2σ2bv1 + T
2σ2bv2 = a
2,
−1 ≤ ρpi,vj ≤ 1,
−1 ≤ ρvi,vj ≤ 1,
−1 ≤ ρpi,pj ≤ 1,
σpi, σvi ≥ 0, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}
where
WeK =

 w11 w12
w21 w22

 (93)
is the Kalman filter gain calculated using the equivalent measurement covariance matrix Re and
equivalent measurement matrix He. It is easy to show that
Tr
[
WKΣKW
T
K
]
= Tr
[
WTKWKΣK
] (94)
= (w211 + w
2
21)
2s1 + (w
2
12 + w
2
22)
2s3
+2(w11w12 + w21w22)s2
Clearly, all the ρs that appear in s1 and s3 should be set as 1 to maximize the objective function.
The optimal values for ρs in s2 depend on the Kalman filter gain WeK . More specifically, when
21
w11w12 +w21w22 > 0, all the ρs that appear in s2 should be set to 1; otherwise, they should be
set as −1. Let us first suppose that w11w12 + w21w22 > 0 is true, then we have
Tr
[
WKΣKW
T
K
]
= (w211 + w
2
21)
2(cp1σp1 + cp2σp2)
2
+ (w212 + w
2
22)
2(cv1σv1 + cv2σv2)
2
+ 2(w11w12 + w21w22)(cp1cv1σp1σv1 + cp1cv2σp1σv2
+ cp2cv1σp2σv1 + cp2cv2σp2σv2)
(95)
So far, we have converted the objective function in (92), which involves 10 variables to one
that involves only 4 variables. Considering that the power constraint reduces one degree of
freedom, we only need to solve an optimization problem in a 3-dimensional space.
4) Strategy for a Single Sensor with Multiple Time Attacks: Based on Proposition 2, we get
the extra mean squared error matrix,
AK+N =
N∑
m=0
DmΣK+N−mD
T
m
Supposing that the adversary attacks the system continuously from time K to K + N , the
weighted extra mean squared error matrices at different time are as shown below,
A
′
K+0 = α0(D0ΣKD
T
0 )
A
′
K+1 = α1(D0ΣK+1D
T
0 +D1ΣKD
T
1 ) (96)
...
A
′
K+N = αN(D0ΣK+ND
T
0 + ... +DNΣKD
T
N)
where αi, i ∈ N is the weight of extra mean squared error matrix at time i, and
∑N
i=0 αi = 1.
The objective function in the multi-time attack problem is the trace of weighted sum of the extra
mean squared error matrices at different time:
Tr
(
N∑
i=0
αiAK+i
)
= Tr
(
N∑
i=0
A
′
K+i
)
(97)
Maximizing the term above is equivalent to maximize the trace of the weighted sum of the
mean squared error matrices of the state estimates over time, because once the system reaches
its steady state, PK+i|K+i will be a constant, and the weighted sum of PK+i|K+i will remain the
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same. First we study the case with position sensors only, where all the terms in (96) are scalars.
Using lower case d, σp to denote D,Σ, we can formulate the optimization problem below,
max
N∑
i=0
αiAK+i =
N∑
i=0
A
′
K+i (98)
= σ2pK+0(α0d
2
0 + α1d
2
1 + ... + αNd
2
N)
+σ2pK+1(α1d
2
0 + α2d
2
1 + ... + αNd
2
N−1)
+σ2pK+2(α2d
2
0 + α3d
2
1 + ... + αNd
2
N−2)
+...
+σ2pK+N (αNd
2
0)
s.t.
K+N∑
i=K
σ2pi ≤ a
2
N∑
i=0
αi = 1
The adversary can allocate the power based on the coefficient of the variance variables at different
time. For example, if the weights α′is are all the same, the best strategy is to allocate all the
power to the sensor at the first beginning (at time K) because the coefficient for σ2pK+0 is the
largest.
Second, let us consider the case with position and velocity sensors. The optimization problem
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can be characterized as follows,
max Tr
[
N∑
m=0
αiAK+i
]
= Tr
[
N∑
m=0
A
′
K+i
]
(99)
= Tr
[
ΣK+0(α0D
T
0D0 + ...+ αND
T
NDN )
]
+Tr
[
ΣK+1(α1D
T
0D0 + ...+ αND
T
N−1DN−1)
]
+Tr
[
ΣK+2(α2D
T
0D0 + ...+ αND
T
N−2DN−2)
]
+...
+Tr
[
ΣK+N(αND
T
0D0)
]
s.t.
K+N∑
i=K
σ2pi + T
2σ2vi ≤ a
2
N∑
i=0
αi = 1
Since Σi and DTj Dj are positive semidefinite matrices, Tr
[
Σi(D
T
j Dj)
]
≥ 0. Trace is a mono-
tonically increasing function of the positive semidefinite matrix, that is to say, if A and B are
both positive semidefinite matrices, and A > B, then Tr(A) > Tr(B). So the best strategy for
the adversary to attack the system is to allocate all the power to Σi with the largest positive
semidefinite matrix of
∑N
i=s αiD
T
i−sDi−s. If the adversary’s goal is to maximize the average
effect of the false information, the best strategy is to put all the power at time K.
B. Attack Strategy Analysis from Determinant Perspective
1) Attack Strategy for Multiple Position Sensors: We are also interested in the effect of
bias information on the Kalman filter’s mean squared estimation error from the determinant
perspective. By using the equivalent measurement approach as in Section VII-A1, we have
|PK|K +AK | = |PK|K + ΣeKD0D
T
0 |
= |PK|K||I+ ΣeKD0P
−1
K|KD
T
0 |
(100)
where D0 can be obtained using (42) and ΣeK is defined in (63). As PK|K is constant and
positive definite, D0P−1K|KDT0 is positive semidefinite meaning that all the eigenvalues of the
D0P
−1
K|KD
T
0 are non-negative. First, let us denote C as a square matrix whose columns are the
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eigenvectors of D0P−1K|KDT0 . Then through eigendecomposition, (100) can be written concisely
as,
|PK|K||CIC
−1 + ΣeKCΛC
−1|
= |PK|K||I+ ΣeKΛ|
(101)
where Λ is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the eigenvalues of the D0P−1K|KDT0 .
So we just need to maximize ΣeK in order to maximize the determinant of PK|K +AK . This
is equivalent to maximizing the trace of PK|K +AK as discussed in Section VII-A1.
2) Attack Strategy for a Single Position and Velocity Sensor: We assume that the adversary
knows the system model and the prior information P0|0 at time zero, so that he/she can calculate
the offline Kalman filter gain matrix Wk recursively. The best attack strategy is the solution to
the following optimization problem.
max
ΣK
∣∣PK|K +WKΣKWTK∣∣
s.t. σ2bp + T
2σ2bv = a
2 (102)
−1 ≤ ρbp,bv ≤ 1
σbp , σbv > 0
where WKΣKWTK = AK , and
ΣK =

 σ2bp ρbp,bvσbpσbv
ρbp,bvσbpσbv σ
2
bv

 (103)
Using the properties of the determinant, we get the formula as follows.
|PK|K +WKΣKW
T
K |
= |PK|K||In +ΣKW
T
KP
−1
K|KWK | (104)
Since PK|K is independent of ΣK , the optimization problem can be further written as:
max
ΣK
∣∣∣In +ΣKWTKP−1K|KWK∣∣∣
s.t. σ2bp + T
2σ2bv = a
2 (105)
−1 ≤ ρbp,bv ≤ 1
σbp , σbv > 0
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By defining
WTKP
−1
K|KWK =

 m1 m2
m2 m3

 (106)
and after simplifying (105), the objective function becomes∣∣∣In +ΣKWTKP−1K|KWK∣∣∣
= 1 + (1− ρ2bp,bv)σ
2
bpσ
2
bv(m1m3 −m
2
2) (107)
+σ2bpm1 + σ
2
bvm3 + 2ρbp,bvσbpσbvm2
The solution to the optimization problem will be the best strategy to attack the system. In order
to get closed-form solutions, we denote ΣK = RTR where ΣK is invertible, and∣∣∣In +ΣKWTKP−1K|KWK∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣In +RTRWTKP−1K|KWK∣∣∣ (108)
=
∣∣∣In +RWTKP−1K|KWKRT ∣∣∣
To facilitate the derivations, we introduce two lemmas from [19], which are provided below.
Lemma 1. Suppose A and B are n× n positive semidefinite matrices with eigendecomposition
A = DAΣAD
T
A and B = DBΣBDTB, the eigenvalues of A and B satisfy that α1 ≥ α ≥ · · ·αn
and β1 ≥ β ≥ · · ·βn, then
Πni=1(αi + βi) ≤ det(A+B) ≤ Π
n
i=1(αi + βn+1−i) (109)
where the upper bound is achieved if and only if DA = DBP, and the lower bound is achieved
if and only if DA = DB , where P is defined below,
P =


0 0 · · · 1
0 · · · 1 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 0 · · · 0

 (110)
The optimal solution achieving the upper bound is the best attack strategy with the most effect
on the Kalman filter system, and that achieving the lower bound is the strategy with the least
effect on the Kalman filter system.
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Lemma 2. Given an n×n matrix V1 and an n×n positive semidefinite matrix Q1 with V1Q1VT1
being a diagonal matrix with its diagonal elements in increasing order, it is always possible to
find another n× n matrix V¯1 such that V¯1Q1V¯T1 = βV1Q1VT1 with Tr(V1VT1 ) = Tr(V¯1V¯T1 )
where β ≥ 1. V¯1 can be written as ΣQDT1 , where D1 is the unitary matrix whose columns
are the eigenvectors corresponding to the eigenvalues of Q1 in increasing order, and ΣQ is a
diagonal matrix.
By combining the two lemmas together, we can get the final optimal solution to the optimiza-
tion problem above. It is obvious that In and RWTKP−1K|KWKRT are both positive semidefinite
matrices. The eigendecomposition of the two items above can be written as follows,
In = DIΣ1D
T
I
RWTKP
−1
K|KWKR
T = D2Σ2D
T
2 (111)
with identity matrix Σ1 and Σ2 = diag([σ2,1, · · · , σ2,n]). Based on Lemma 1, we have∣∣∣In +RWTKP−1K|KWKRT ∣∣∣ ≤ Πni=1(σ1,i + 1) (112)
where D2P = D1, and
|In +RW
T
KP
−1
K|KWKR
T |
= |DT1 ||In +RW
T
KP
−1
K|KWKR
T ||D1| (113)
= |In +D
T
1RW
T
KP
−1
K|KWKR
TD1|
Set R1 = DT1R and Σ3 = PΣ2PT with the eigenvalues in increasing order and we know that
Tr(RRT ) = Tr(R1R
T
1 ). So the optimization problem can be written as below,
max |In +R1W
T
KP
−1
K|KWKR
T
1 |
s.t. T r(R1R
T
1 ) ≤ a
2 (114)
R1W
T
KP
−1
K|KWKR
T
1 = Σ3
Let us set WTKP
−1
K|KWK = Q˜. Based on Lemma 2, R1Q˜RT1 = Σ3, we can surely find a
matrix R¯ such that R¯1Q˜R¯T1 = βR1Q˜RT1 , for β ≥ 1. Note that the determinant is a monotonic
increasing function of the positive semidefinite matrix. So
|In +R1Q˜R
T
1 | ≤ |In + R¯1Q˜R¯
T
1 | (115)
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So the optimal solution R¯ should be in the form of V¯. The eigendecompostion of Q˜ is as
follows,
Q˜ = VQΣQV
T
Q (116)
where ΣQ = diag([σq,1, σq,2, · · · , σq,n]) with its diagonal elements in increasing order. VQ is a
unitary matrix whose column vectors correspond to the eigenvalues of Q˜. The problem can be
written as
max
σ2
b,i
n∑
i=1
log(σ2b,iσq,i + 1) (117)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
(σ2b,i) ≤ a
2
The objective function above is a concave and increasing function. The optimal solution is
achieved through Lagrangian multipliers yielding the water-filling strategy,
σ2b,i =
(
1
λ
−
1
σq,i
)+
(118)
where the value of λ can be obtained by solving
n∑
i=1
(
1
λ
−
1
σq,i
)+
= a2 (119)
The solution is
Ropt = D1[Σ
1/2
b ]
TVTQ (120)
Finally, the optimal solution of (105) is,
ΣK = VQΣbV
T
Q (121)
Theorem 3. For a system with one sensor that provides position and velocity measurements, the
optimal strategy for the adversary to attack the system in order to maximize the determinant of
mean squared error matrix is
ΣK = VQΣbV
T
Q (122)
where Σb = diag([σ2b,1, σ2b,2, · · · , σ2b,n]) , σ2b,i =
(
1
λ
− 1
σq,i
)+
and
∑n
i=1
(
1
λ
− 1
σq,i
)+
= a2, VQ is
a unitary matrix whose column vectors corresponds to the eigenvalues σq,i’s of WTKP−1K|KWK ,
σq,i, i ∈ {1, n} is in increasing order.
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3) Attack Strategy for Multiple Position and Velocity Sensors: For a system with multiple
sensors, the best strategy to allocate the bias noise power and set the correlation coefficients
among the bias noises at different sensors is also investigated. Let us denote the number of
sensors as M , and the measurement matrix as H = [I2, · · · , I2]T . The measurement covariance
matrix for the ith sensor is assumed to be
Ri =

 σ2pi 0
0 σ2vi

 (123)
Now, according to (53), we have
Re =
(
M∑
i=1
R−1i
)−1
=


(∑M
i=1 σ
−2
pi
)−1
0
0
(∑M
i=1 σ
−2
vi
)−1


(124)
According to (51), we define
Ci = ReR
−1
i
=


σ−2pi∑M
j=1 σ
−2
pj
0
0
σ−2vi∑M
j=1 σ
−2
vj

 (125)
as the weighting matrix for the ith sensor’s observation zi.
The equivalent injected bias noise is therefore
beK =
M∑
i=1
CibKi (126)
and the covariance matrix of the equivalent bias vector is
ΣeK =
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
CiE
[
bib
T
j
]
CTj (127)
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Now the optimization problem can be formulated as follows.
max
ΣeK
∣∣PK|K +WeKΣeKWTeK∣∣ (128)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
σ2bpi + T
2
N∑
j=1
σ2bvi = a
2,
−1 ≤ ρbpi ,bvj ≤ 1,
−1 ≤ ρbvi ,bvj ≤ 1,
−1 ≤ ρbpi ,bpj ≤ 1,
σbpi , σbvi ≥ 0, ∀i, j ∈ {1,M}
where WeK is the Kalman filter gain calculated using He and Re. The optimal solution of (128)
can be obtained numerically as shown later in Chapter VIII of the thesis.
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VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Numerical results are presented in this chapter to demonstrate the effectiveness of the derived
attack strategies.
A. Systems with Position Sensors
The parameters used in the target tracking example are provided below. The system sampling
interval is T = 1. The adversary injects bias information to two sensors with σ2w1 = 3 and
σ2w2 = 4, respectively. The variance of the system process noise is σ
2
v = 0.25. The biases bis are
zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variances σ2bis. For the power constraint we discussed
earlier, we set the sum of σ2bi to be 3000.
The effect of the bias injection on the Kalman filter is measured by the normalized MSE.
More specifically, we use the sum of the normalized MSE over Nm Monte-Carlo runs
qk =
Nm∑
j=1
[
xˆ
′j
k|k − x
j
k
]T
P−1k|k
[
xˆ
′j
k|k − x
j
k
]
(129)
where at time k, Pk|k is the nominal state covariance matrix calculated by the Kalman filter, xˆ′jk|k
is the state estimate, and xjk is the true state, during the jth Monte-Carlo run. First, if the random
biases injected to different sensors are independent, we should allocate all the bias power to the
sensor with the smallest measurement noise variance. This is clearly true as demonstrated in
Fig. 2, where allocating all the power to sensor 1 causes the maximum mean squared estimation
error. In Fig. 3, three dependent-noise attack strategies are compared, including the optimal one
according to (67), allocating the power equally among the sensors, and allocating all the power to
the sensor with the smallest measurement error variance. It is clear that the optimal solution has
the largest impact on the estimation performance, and it outperforms the best independent-noise
attack strategy significantly.
B. Systems with Position and Velocity Sensors
We now consider the case where the adversary attacks the Kalman filtering system with a
vector sensor observation containing both position and velocity measurements. We first consider
a single-sensor system, and the sensor has a position measurement variance of 3 and a velocity
measurement variance of 4. We set the sum of σ2bp1 and T
2σ2bv1 to be 3000. In this particular
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case, w11w12 + w21w22 > 0, so the optimal choice is ρbp,bv = 1. Based on Theorem 2, the best
strategy is to set σbp = 52.3 and σbv = 16.2. It is clear from Fig. 4 that the strategy provided in
Theorem 2 maximizes the MSE of the Kalman filter system by injecting vector bias information.
Next we consider a system with two sensors. The first sensor is the same as the one described
above, and the second one is with position measurement variance 4 and velocity measurement
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Fig. 4. The normalized MSE for a system with a single sensor. σ2p1 + T
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variance 5. In this particular case, again we have w11w12 + w21w22 > 0, so all the ρs in s1, s2,
and s3 should be set as 1. We first use a systematic grid search to find an approximate globally
optimal solution and then we use the FMINCON function in Matlab, a local search algorithm,
to refine this approximate globally optimal solution. The optimal solution we have obtained is
σ2bp1 = 1826, σ
2
bp2
= 1023, σ2bv1 = 81, σ
2
bv2
= 68. For comparison purpose, we also implement
an attack strategy that allocate power equally among the observation components and among
the two sensors, which is σ2bp1 = σ
2
bp2
= σ2bv1 = σ
2
bv2
= 750. The simulation result is shown in
Fig. 5. As we can see, the optimal attack strategy has a much greater impact than the one that
allocates power equally. Based on the optimal solution, we can find that allocating more power
to the measurement with lower variance will have a greater effect on the Kalman filter system.
C. Determinant Case
Numerical results are presented in this section to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed
attack strategies. Assuming that the injected bias noise bk is zero-mean and Gaussian distributed,
we can show that the posterior probability density function (PDF) of the target state conditioned
on the past observations and the current corrupted observation is
p(xK |z1:K−1, z
′
K) = N (xˆK|K,PK|K +AK) (130)
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where xˆK|K is the updated state estimate calculated by the Kalman filter, which is unaware of
the presence of the injected false information. Then the target state xK will be in the following
confidence region (or error ellipse)
{
x : (x− xˆK|K)
T (PK|K +AK)
−1(x− xˆK|K) ≤ γ
} (131)
with a probability that is determined by the threshold γ [20]. The volume of the confidence
region defined by (131) corresponding to the threshold γ is
V (K) = cnx|γ(PK|K +AK)|
1/2 (132)
where nx is the dimension of the target state x,
cn =
πn/2
Γ(n/2 + 1)
(133)
and Γ(·) is the gamma function. First, let us consider a single-sensor case, where the sensor has a
position measurement with noise variance of 3, which is independent of the velocity measurement
with noise variance of 4. We set the bias noise power constraint as σ2bp+T
2σ2bv = 3000. Based on
Theorem 3, we have σ2bp = 1500, σ
2
bv
= 1500, and ρbp,v = 0.063, which is the same as the solution
obtained numerically. In Fig. 6, error ellipses for different attack strategies are plotted. For all
the different attack strategies, we set ρbp,v = 0.063. As we can see, under normal condition
without false information injection, the error ellipse has the smallest area, while the optimal
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attack strategy leads to an error ellipse with the largest area. In Figs. 7 and 8, the volume (area)
of the error ellipse is provided as a function of ρbp,v and the ratio κ =
σbp
σbvT
. We can see that
when the κ = σbp
σbvT
= 1, the area of the ellipse is maximized. Also from Figs. 7 and 8, it is
clear that the area of ellipse increases as the absolute value of ρ decreases. In Fig. 9, the trend
of the error ellipses as the ρ changes from −1 to +1 is illustrated.
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In this particular case, since σ2bp + T
2σ2bv = 3000, ΣK is large and in (102) the second term
(WKΣKWTK) dominates. Therefore, in (107) the identity matrix in the objective function is
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relatively small comparing to the second term, and approximately we have∣∣∣In +ΣKWTKP−1K|KWK∣∣∣
≈ |ΣK |
∣∣∣WTKP−1K|KWK∣∣∣ (134)
The second term in the second line of the above equation is a constant. Hence, in order to
get the maximum determinant, we should set σ2bp = σ
2
bv
T 2 and ρbp,bv = 0. This is almost the
same solution as we have obtained using the optimal water-filling strategy. Next we consider
a system with two sensors. The first sensor is the same as the one described above, and the
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second one is with position measurement variance 4 and velocity measurement variance 5.
To solve the optimization problem formulated in (128), we first use a systematic grid search
to find an approximate globally optimal solution and then we use the FMINCON function
in Matlab, a local search algorithm, to refine this approximate globally optimal solution. The
optimal solution we have obtained is σ2bp1 = 1100, σ
2
bp2
= 600, σ2bv1 = 750, σ
2
bv2
= 550,
ρbp1,p2 = 0.99, ρbp1,v1 = −0.83, ρbp1,v2 = 0.75, ρbv1,p2 = 0.89, ρbp2,v2 = −0.23, ρbv1,v2 = 0.95.
For comparison purpose, we introduce three sub-optimal attack strategies: Strategy I with all
the ρs being 0s, and σ2bp1 = 1100, σ
2
bp2
= 600, σ2bv1 = 750, σ
2
bv2
= 550; Strategy II with all the
ρs being 1s, and σ2bp1 = 1100, σ
2
bp2
= 600, σ2bv1 = 750, σ
2
bv2
= 550; and Strategy III with the ρs
being the same as those for the optimal strategy, and σ2bp1 = σ
2
bp2
= σ2bv1 = σ
2
bv2
= 750. The
numerical results are shown in Fig. 10. As we can see, the optimal attack strategy has a greater
impact than those sub-optimal attack strategies, resulting in the largest error ellipse.
37
IX. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, the impact of false information injection on the Kalman filter’s state estimation
was studied. We derived the EMSE due to the injected random biases for a Kalman filter in a
linear dynamic system. This allows us to find how to allocate the bias power among multiple
sensors in order to maximize the effect of the false information on the Kalman filter from
two perspectives: trace and determinant of the MSE matrix. By using the equivalent sensor to
denote the multiple sensors in the Kalman filter system, the analysis of optimization problem is
simplified a lot. A concrete example of multi-sensor target tracking system has been provided.
In this example, we investigated both the case where the sensors provide position measurements
and the case where they collect both position and velocity measurements. For the case where the
sensors provide only position measurements, we have found that the dependent false information
will incur more Kalman filter system state estimation error than the independent one does. From
the trace and determinant perspectives, many closed-form results have been provided for the
optimal attack strategies. In the future, we will use game theory and hypothesis testing techniques
to characterize the model in order to have a better understanding of the false information attacks
and Kalman filter’s defense against such attacks.
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